On June 18, the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held the first Sustainable Lunar Activities Conference in Vienna. The meeting underscored the importance of transparency and cooperation to unleash the Moon’s benefits – whether political of economic- for all of humanity. UNOOSA Director Aarti Holla-Maini highlighted “the need for consultation and coordination on lunar exploration rather than a ‘space race’ or division of space policy. “
In the context of the U.S. and China’s lunar exploration efforts, the existence or not of a “space race” is at the crux of a key narrative gap that defines the strategies of both countries and their partners (Artemis Accords vs ILRS). Here are the 10 elements to strengthen your grasp of the stakes.
1. After a period of abandonment, there is a renewed interest in crewed lunar missions for a variety of reasons: national prestige, economic benefits, security, etc.
2. Whereas the US remains the only power to have landed a man on the Moon, it is a late comer to Phase 2: China started launching robots in lunar orbits in 2007, a milestone the US reached in 2022
A Timeline of Chinese and US Lunar Exploration Milestones
3. US policymakers, media, and legislators overwhelmingly point out that there is a space race opposing the US and its allies to China – with parallels between China’s geopolitical antics down here and the threat it may pose if it is allowed to gain a foothold up there.
4. The view is understandable: one of China’s top lunar project planners told state media in 2019 that “The universe is an ocean, the moon is the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, Mars is Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal).” Yet official Chinese sources insist there is no such thing as a Moon Race, while state media mocks the Americans for even expressing such a take. From China’s perspective, lunar exploration is not a race with the US
5. Sure, Beijing could be deceptive, and Washington could be attempting to establish hegemony on their own terms (history is ripe with examples of both). There are also strong explanatory models that assume both Beijing and Washington truly mean what they say: they could be playing a game of expectations ahead of a feared “Thucydides trap”. They could be prone to path dependency by tackling this relatively cutting edge topic with already used tools (previous Space Race for the US, narratives about shared common destiny for China). They could be posturing to rally domestic and international support
6. This competition is playing out very differently from the Cold War Space Race that so often ends up serving as a blueprint to analyze today’s events. The methods are much broader, involving technological innovation but also legal squabbles (from Wolf Amendment to export control shenanigans from both sides), a widespread weaponizing of space (ranging from Space Forces to nuclear weapons in space and varying anti-satellite weapons), and a funding race. If there is such a thing as a new space race for lunar exploration, it needs to be “races” in plural. This matters because it means several “battlefields.”
7. One such battlefield is a diplomatic one. Unlike the previous space race, third countries are actively enlisted on either the Artemis Accords or the ILRS. This includes countries with technical expertise and long space histories but also newcomers to the scene, Global South nations, and small states. This indicates that those programs are more than technical alliances: they are camps promoting a certain worldview and certain norms for outer space. These coalitions will likely significantly affect regulations, funding opportunities, and policy in each country and market.
8. The narrative gap presents a real danger: a mutually acknowledged race includes implicit or explicit ground rules, and a shared vision of the future. A competition without mutual acknowledgement opens the door to escalation, necessitating anchors and guardrails.
9. Due to the variety of facets in U.S.-China lunar competition and the aforementioned narrative gap, there are opportunities to bridge distrust by cooperating on some of the less sensitive aspects that present a common challenge for every actor, in effect compartmentalizing the competition instead of letting it run out of control. These include lunar sustainability, medicine & life support, and logistics. These areas may become niches for scientific, academic, and commercial cooperation. As unlikely as it sounds now, the holding of events such as the first Sustainable Lunar Activities Conference represent a promising step for healthier governance of this competition.
10. Looking ahead, the only worse thing than an explicit space race is an unbridled competition. The Narrative Gap can be a threat, but also an opportunity – if both the US and China refrain from creating heavy stakes for “winning”‘ over the other, it opens the door to alternatives to a decisive checkmate that is, in all cases, unlikely to occur. The U.S.-China Moon Competition could go horribly wrong, but it could also become a model for the responsible great power relations that spokesperson in DC and Beijing both like to talk about, with benefits trickling down to the rest of the industry.